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Sub-regional Security Protocols and Demilitarisation in Africa:

1:1 Introduction:

The *Africa Leadership Forum* has for over a decade grappled with the dynamics of regional and national security and their close-linkages with the overriding problems of development on the continent.

In 1991, the *Africa Leadership Forum* in conjunction with the secretariat of the *Organisation of African Unity*. OAU convened a high level meeting in Kampala, Uganda. The meeting had sought to redefine the entire concept of security as a primary pillar of stability and development on the continent. The Kampala Meeting went ahead to propose a Conference on Security, Stability, Co-operation and Development in Africa, otherwise known as the CSSDCA.

Proceeding from the Kampala meeting, the *Africa Leadership Forum* (ALF) convened in Lilongwe, Malawi, a meeting of Military and Civil Society leaders in September 1996. At the Lilongwe Meeting participants suggested among other recommendations that efforts should be intensified in collaboration with other organization, a range of conferences to facilitate a deeper examination of specific issues around the topic that has emerged.

The Lilongwe Meeting also recommended that, security, with demilitarisation as a major focus, should be seen as an objective that could be incorporated into a redefinition of security & stability concepts in Africa especially in the formulation of a sub-regional defence and security arrangement. Increased co-operation between and among states was pointed out as a condition sine qua non for increased confidence building.

In seeking to advance the core recommendation of the Lilongwe Meeting, the Africa Leadership Forum commissioned a Comparative Study of Existing Sub-

Regional Protocols in Africa with the view to identifying points of convergence to facilitate the adoption of a sub-regional security framework in Africa.

The Arusha Conference on *Leadership Challenges of Demilitarisation in Africa*, July 1998 in collaboration with the Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress has to be seen as a follow-up to the above Conference with the view to deepening the understanding of the concept of security on demilitarisation. The Arusha conference adopted a range of conditions for effective demilitarisation efforts.

One of the major outcomes of the conference was the decision to appoint an Ad Hoc - Working Group on Demilitarisation in Africa. The Ad Hoc Working Group is made up of retired military leaders, leaders of civil society organisations, political leaders, Researchers and experts.

It was agreed that the Ad-hoc Working Group will develop its own agenda, including modalities for persuading the leadership of a selected group of countries to accept and internalise demilitarisation with a view to providing a compelling demonstration effect for other countries in Africa. The Ad Hoc Working Group will undertake the necessary sensitisation mission required in building support and consensus for the idea.

The Working Group activities would include confidence-building missions, advising political leaders, and persuading those in critical leadership positions to consider demilitarisation as a central part of Africa's security arrangements in the next millennium.

Prior to the Arusha Conference, the *Africa Leadership Forum* also convened in Maputo, Mozambique, a high level meeting on the theme *Africa on the Eve of the 21st Century*. That conference implored the ALF to develop collaborative partnerships with key research institutions on the continent and undertake joint research on aspects of African peace and security. Such partnership should also extend to women's institutions and research bodies so as to ensure an accurate gender sensitive analysis.

1:2. Programme Activity:

With a view to synthesising the various activities highlighted above, and as a concrete follow-up to the Study on Sub-Regional Security Protocols in Africa and the Arusha conference on Leadership Challenges of Demilitarisation in Africa, The Africa Leadership Forum (ALF) in collaboration with the Arias Foundation for Human Progress and the United Nations Development Programme, UNDP, convened in Ota, Nigeria, an international conference 9-11 May, 1999. The Conference, with the theme *Sub-regional Security Protocols and Demilitarisation in Africa*, sought to advance the cause of security and demilitarisation on the continent and examine specific issues that are vital to activating the mandates of the Ad-hoc Working Group. Over 150 participants attended the Conference from Africa and beyond. The participants included former Heads of governments, State ministers, retired and serving senior army officers, diplomats, scholars, and representatives of international organisations, media operators and major stakeholders on the issue of security and demilitarisation across the world.

The conference focused on six major areas of concern:

- Sub-regional security protocols in Africa
- Security protocols and the challenges of stability
- Small arms proliferation and small arms moratorium
- The interest of the United States in Demilitarisation in Africa.
- Ad-hoc working group on demilitarisation in Africa
- African elders council for peace

In discussing these issues, the conference emphasised the close linkage between peace, security, stability, development and co-operation in Africa as a pre-condition for designing any effective response and strategy aimed at resolving the conflicts besetting the continent. It also reiterated the conviction that there cannot be sustainable development unless peace and security in and between countries is attained, bearing in mind the inter-relationship between security, equity and economic co-operation. Moreover, the concept of security was operationalised beyond the traditional scope of national security to include the

dimensions of individual, human, environmental, social and community security. The Conference therefore concluded as follows:

- Existing security protocols need to be revised to make them more transparent. More institutionalised ways of engaging civil society in defence and security matters should be devised by, for instance, involving the private sector in developing strategies for coping with the economic implications of demilitarisation. The international community also has to be persuaded to actively support countries currently engaged in demilitarisation.
- The issue of human security has to be clearly connected to the issue of democracy and the ability of citizens to hold the state accountable for all the things done in their name under the rubric of national security. Indeed, the starting point of any efforts at rebuilding the continent's security architecture and at providing stability and human security has to be anchored on a deep respect for the rule of law and the fundamental human rights of the citizens. This is coupled with a more robust understanding of some of the realities of the conflicts in terms of its scale and immense impact on development.
- Demilitarisation is about pruning down the army to a size that is feasible for a country. It also means reduction in overblown military budgets. These can be effectively done once the major political and social forces within a country have accepted a regime and are ready to work within the framework of that regime. This is why demilitarisation process has to start from the mind of the people and must be backed by reasonable incentives that would not only feel secure without arms, but will also provide them with alternative means of livelihood other than violence. Essentially, demilitarisation process is not about the control of importation of weapons alone, but more about how to deal with the guns that are already on the ground. Experience in Africa has in fact, shown that cutting defence budgets may not go a long way in achieving the desired objectives of demilitarisation because such reduction, in places where it has happened, have not necessarily translated into improved social welfare or social services for the people. Therefore, the Ad hoc

Working Group on Demilitarisation should look more closely at the nuances of the relationship between reduction in defence budgets and improved social welfare and their role in demilitarisation.

- While the Central American formula should not be seen as a magic formula as it may not work for every country or region, those countries have however, taught others that consensus and decision to work by the same international agreement and standards can go a long way in the search for peace. Therefore, the experience of Latin American countries in demilitarisation should be explored with a view to seeing whether the process adopted by those countries could be made relevant to the African situation.
- ECOWAS, with its multiple potentials, has the capacity to provide a good platform for durable economic growth and integrated development of the sub-region. Despite the good results recorded by the ECOMOG in recent times "therefore, a new regional security framework still needs to be devised, which will des! With conflict issues and leave ECOWAS to attend to 2nd effectively play its duty of economic integration of the sub-region and no longer be bogged down by security issues. This new structure, it was suggested, must not be strictly intergovernmental, but an arrangement that will involve the government, the civil society organisations and the OAU.
- Owing to obvious lapses in the structures and functioning of ANAD and ECOMOG and the realities of geo-political contests in the sub-region, the fundamental rules of these institutions should be revised. Ultimately, a new structure needs to be created, which would be more adapted to the context and proper interests of African people and more effective in guaranteeing sub-regional security.
- For this new collective security framework to be efficient, it should enjoy an independent status, serve as catalyst to the initiatives of State, civil society, O.A.U, U.N, and bilateral foreign partners. This structure should be led by Africans with strong moral authority and who are also known for

their experience, wisdom and their Pan-African vision and who can make the structure an effective instrument for peace promotion in Africa.

- Where there are no immediate or medium term conventional external threat, requirement for conventional equipment and weapons should be reduced to quantities that are needed for training purposes only. The size and equipment of the army in *every* state should also be made compatible only with the peacekeeping obligations of such states as well as their requirements for coping with environmental and economic threats.
- To ensure compliance with the spirit of agreements and existing protocols as another side to the security and stability concern, sub-regional security arrangement has to be based on a sound moral authority. A most important challenge was that of establishing the link between sub-regional security protocols and the original agenda for continental security.
- The presence of a threat need not be an excuse for not demilitarising because demilitarisation is a bold political decision, which is also vital to the economic development of the various regions and Africa as a whole.
- If peacekeeping missions must be effective, policy makers must master the dynamics of the conflicts by having a robust appreciation of the problems on the ground, as this must be what determines the nature of approach to the conflict. Compliance with peace process can also be made easier if the regions are determined and are prepared to strengthen peace-keeping force and support the United Nations and the international community.
- Peace-keeping missions may not always be as successful as expected due to a multiplicity of factors. However, when peace-keeping efforts fail, the alternative does not *have* to be peace enforcement, which is often problematic. African countries therefore, should recognise that peace negotiation could also inspire genuine consensus as an approach to conflict handling.

- Military decisions, including when, why and how to move in the army has to be backed by a clear political decision and objectives. Right from the on set, decision makers should able to project what kind of political outcome is desired in a given conflict.
- The Meeting also suggested that for African countries to cope effectively with the challenges of stability, the process of disarmament and demobilisation in all conflict areas should be comprehensive and executed as quickly as possible. It was believed that only an integrated and speedy approach to the process could prevent rebels from breaking into camps to liberate their colleagues who have already been disarmed and get them back in action.
- Similarly, an integrated approach to conflict resolution, particularly within the West African Sub-region requires an effective reconciliation of ECOMOG with ANAD. Such a move would erase the suspicion that has been created by the apparent rivalry between the two groups. The perceived division and rivalry between Anglophone countries and their Francophone counterparts have crippled the continent in many respects and have led to a concentration of efforts and resources on unimportant pursuits rather than on issues and programmes that would benefit the majority of African people. African leaders should therefore, work towards bridging the gaps between the two groups.
- International efforts at mediation have to be based on a thorough understanding of the political dimensions of conflicts at the local level if it must achieve the desired results. In discussing with warring groups, mediating bodies should also employ persuasion and work towards drawing up a power sharing formula that would enjoy the various and collective consent of the warring groups. In the same vein, the resources and training opportunities offered by the American Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) should be properly exploited to enhance the funding capacity and effectiveness of peace-keeping forces in Africa.

- Research information is very crucial to conflicts management in Africa. Therefore, the African Research Network should be re-enforced as a body of researchers engaged by governments to carry out independent investigations into particular crises outside the official machinery. In doing this, government, both at the regional and state level should use more of African researchers.
- Africa should develop an integrated and systematic security paradigm that would be relevant to the entire African socio-political environment. The current approach, which only seeks to address the security problem in Africa 'in terms of the circumstances prevailing only in some parts of the continent, cannot adequately take care of the problem. Moreover, the nature of existing security protocols, which tends to focus on inter-state conflicts needs to be reviewed because the reason many states may be reluctant to demilitarise is more for internal security than for fear of invasion from another country. Therefore, a new security architecture for Africa has to be erected on the Kampala Document, which emphasises integration and collective security by encouraging neighbouring countries to come to some kind of understanding whereby the fear of an attack from one another is reduced to zero.
- All doctrines and training system on peacekeeping and security for Africa must be harmonised if they must achieve maximum impact. Towards this end, OAU should take charge of the training systems and have a single training centre for peacekeeping in Africa.
- In the last ten years, most intra-state conflicts have been fought with small arms, which have made political and ethnic conflicts very violent even at very early stages, Because of this therefore, between 80-90 percent of all casualties of recent wars have been produced by small arms, and these victims have been largely civilians not directly involved in the conflicts.
- Monitoring the traffic of the international arms trade is problematic, as the exact size of the trade is not reported in statistics and the weapons are very easy to move around. And because they are relatively cheap,

accessible, rugged and easy to operate even by untrained persons, they are very difficult to control.

- There is a direct link between small arms and the escalation of criminal activities in conflict areas so much that very often, it is difficult to distinguish between criminal activities and the conflicts that have made it possible for militants to arm themselves.
- Moreover, small arms have an addictive capacity because they easily become a way of life wherever they have been employed in conflicts even long after the crises have ended. This nurtures a dysfunctional socialisation process that tends to redefine success from the perspective of violence thus creating a long term damage to the social values of the societies than the instant bloodshed and anguish caused by the conflicts.
- A comprehensive approach to peace building is required as a fundamental process in addressing all the ramifications of small arms proliferation, as domestic arms control is just one element of ensuring peace. Democratic participation, social justice and a constructive culture of civilised conflict resolution are other dimensions of peace building. For disarmament to be effective, the state has to prove capable of guaranteeing the security of lives of the people by strengthening the police force and training the police to respect the fundamental human rights of the people and act at all time within the bounds of the law. An efficient customs service also needs to be developed to ensure that the borders are well guarded and could not be used for smuggling of arms. The judiciary' also needs to be strengthened to ensure that smugglers and other criminals are punished according to the law. This is crucial to peace building as it will discourage the people from taking law into their hands and will also act as a deterrent mechanism for others with criminal tendencies.
- The moratorium on small arms proclaimed by ECOWAS in 1988, with the resolve not to import or export small arms is commendable. However, the tragic wave of violent conflicts in the sub-region since this ECOWAS move many of which were prosecuted largely with small arms, makes a strong case for the need to develop and enforce the moratorium.

- Small arms proliferation is directly related to the child soldier phenomenon as small arms can easily be carried around and operated even by small boys. In this regard, the Meeting viewed with seriousness the UNICEF report that there are over 300, 000 child soldiers fighting all over the world and other reports, which say that in Sierra Leone alone, over 3,000 children are fighting with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Therefore, Participants agreed that the child soldier problem is very crucial to all efforts at sustainable peace building, particularly as it concerns demobilisation and social re-integration.
- An ECOWAS moratorium on the use of children as soldiers, similar to the one proclaimed in 1988 on small arms, should be considered as one of the practical ways to arrest the problems of the child soldier in the sub-region. Effective control of small arms should also be considered as a direct strategy for discouraging the use of children as soldiers.
- The conference observed that it is difficult to believe that America is genuinely interested in Africa's security problem because many of the armament industries that supply the weapons used to destroy people on the African continent operate from America with the full knowledge of their government.
- African security interests would be better served if the various American initiatives were channeled through the OAU rather than dealing with, individual African countries. Relating this to demilitarisation, it was noted that America can assist demilitarisation in Africa by offering to bear the financial burden that come with the process, such as the social and economic rehabilitation of disarmed soldiers.
- The idea of a Centre for Strategic Studies is laudable but the concept and approach are decidedly wrong because it ought to be based on a prior systematic discussion or consultation with Africans and operated through existing civil society institutions, like the ALF rather than through direct intervention. Moreover, the conceptual thrust and focus of the CSS programme on leadership is capable of marginalising the potentially productive role that Africa based civil society organisations could play.

Therefore, America should assist civil society organisations to develop the critical capacity to intervene effectively in the African security problem.

- The Ad hoc Working Group on De-militarization should focus on policy options and recommendations based on technical analysis. This way, it could bridge the gap between research and policy. Policy recommendations should also be in the context of improving governance. The on-going process of political liberalization in many Africa countries proves that all institutions, including the military, need to adapt to meet changing situations.
- The group should present recommendations in a way that would appeal to a range of interested parties, including the military. It was considered significant that all parties buy into the process, if it must be viable, and the military was considered to be a most significant of such parties. The meeting also agreed that the issues are complex and that each country has to focus on the specific constraints it faces and on what makes sense in the context of its peculiar circumstances. The group therefore, should focus on the following issues from the perspective of the best practices, lessons learned, and the conditions that need to be in place for the process of demilitarization, whether partial or complete, to make it effective.
- The group should also focus on the general framework for security assessments, including intelligence services, security and police, as well as the military. This is significant to determining the various options and issues of demilitarization viz: force restructuring and creation of professional military in consonance with security needs; reintegration both in post-conflict situations and as part of peacetime restructuring, including the special needs of child soldiers; disarmament and arms control; security and socio-economic implications; and the question of shadow military economy.
- Demilitarisation does not necessarily reduce costs in the short-term because demilitarisation itself has a huge cost implication. It was however believed that over a long-term there should be some reduction

in military expenditure, but some of this saved cost still have to go into civil security and policing. It was also noted that demilitarisation was capable of creating another security problem if the economic growth needed to absorb ex-combatants in post-conflict situations and create employment opportunities are not put in place.

- Democratic control of the military is also another crucial aspect of demilitarisation. This, however, requires capacity building in terms of greater understanding of security issues for all democratic structures especially the parliament. The civil society must also be involved for confidence building and broadening the base of participation in security issues.
- The Ad hoc Working Group will determine its operational framework as well as strike a balance between the ideal and the possible. Since the group is an ad-hoc working group, its structure has to take into account the fact that the individuals in the group have other obligations, therefore, flexibility has to be balanced with general operational efficiency.
- There is the need to establish a focal point since the group is ad hoc, and therefore, cannot have a secretariat. Consequently, the Africa Leadership Forum offered to act as the secretariat. The operational structure however, has to take into account the need not to overburden the ALF. And, in order to operate within obvious resource constraints, the group should meet only once in a year and communicate in the interim by fax and e-mail. It was also resolved that although getting the whole members of the group to be present at all the meetings may be desirable, it may not be possible. Therefore, it was decided that one way of going round this constraint is to see that the group meets during conferences and draw on existing expertise and networks.
- The work-plan, the schedule and benchmark for meeting objectives should be decided by the annual meeting and the reports should be submitted annually. This report should be brief and policy focused. The report could then be made available to a wide range of interested

parties. Case studies and papers used for the report could also be made available.

- The end of the cold war has led to a redefinition of conflicts around the world. Conflicts are no longer seen as merely an extension of the super power confrontations, but in their proper context as independent crises that need to be appraised for what they are and combated accordingly. Moreover, the selective nature of the international intervention efforts has led to the marginalisation of the continent. This has placed the primary responsibility for securing Africa on the Africans themselves. The involvement of the international community through the United Nations or other multinational institutions should only be at the residual level.
- Africa must develop a strategy that would necessarily be based on African traditional methods of conflict resolution as enunciated in the Kampala Document. These methods places the responsibility for settling disputes on elders of the land, who in most African communities serve as adjudicators, peacemakers and mediators in conflicts. The ad hoc committee of the OAU on conflict resolution had been motivated by the conviction that Africans should build on their indigenous values and practices to see themselves as their brother's keepers and intervene or mediate in conflicts without the impediments of sovereignty.
- The Council of Elders for peace is intended to serve in an institutional, culturally oriented approach to conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa and operate on the platform of CSSDCA, which would be created and implemented within the OAU framework. A framework should also be developed that will harmonise the Kampala Document with the OAU conflict resolution mechanism as a process towards creating an umbrella body for security and co-operation in Africa. The Elders Council for Peace can now be created on the platform of this Umbrella body.
- A post-colonial political system in Africa, which was built on competition, has supplanted the African political system based on consensus. This in turn has led to a great leadership crisis on the continent. The Elders Council for Peace therefore, can help in rediscovering this African core

value and contain the acrimony that inadvertently emerges from the crises. It was also noted that Postcolonial conflicts in Africa have greatly eroded the moral authority of traditional institutions. The Council must be addressed towards re-activating this heritage and making them relevant to contemporary crisis of governance on the continent.

- The Elders Council should contain past leaders with sound moral credentials to intervene creditably in conflicts. The Council should, however not be an exclusive club of former heads of states. Non-political leaders, such as retired senior civil servants, scholars, retired soldiers and others should also be included so long as the operational word is 'Elders'.
- The Council should be equipped with the appropriate power of deterrence. It should have the capacity to recommend both rewards and sanctions. It is also important for the Council to be insulated from falling into rivalry with incumbent heads of states.

SECTION TWO: DEMOCRATIC SUSTENANCE FOR TRADE AND STUDENT UNION LEADERS

2:1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The Second workshop on Democratic Sustenance for Trade and Student Union Leaders took place in the Namibian capital, Windhoek, from June 7 to 11th, 1999, in collaboration with the Joint Center for Economic and Political Studies, in South Africa JCSA. It was held at the Safari Hotel, Windhoek.

The workshop was conceptualised based on the current democratisation processes being carried out in many African countries, and the need for these processes to take root among Africa's younger generations if this process is to be well nurtured and sustained throughout the continent in the long-term.

The democratisation process has engendered many new civil society institutions and enhanced old ones to make more meaningful contributions towards

national development in the respective countries while providing a counter-force and creating balance against the institutions and activities of the State.

Yet, in some other respects there have been instances of sharp reversals of political liberalisation, while mutinies elsewhere have also undermined stability. In other cases, it has been the sagacity and adroitness of the political leadership that has kept the gains of democratisation process intact. Many countries have moved away from military dictatorships and one-party states; however the authoritarian practices of the past have become entrenched and institutions of state power have been unaffected by the process of liberalisation.

The extent to which new emerging conflicts may be resolved peacefully, and the current efforts at institutionalising liberal politics, will depend on the existence of vibrant and skillfully managed democratic and administrative institutions, and on the evolution of common values and a culture of tolerance among African peoples and governments.

Therefore, the successor generation of Africans must participate, increasingly in the political and developmental preparations for the next millennium. Sadly, however, the recruitment process in Africa remains skewed and without a carefully thought out programme of deliberate preparation, and there is an obvious need for a systematic, irreversible and progressive nurturing of the successor generation.

The deterioration of public spiritedness, the increasing problems of ethics, the imperatives of globalisation, the emergence of a younger generation elsewhere in the world with a broader and more liberal outlook, and the need to deepen the knowledge of democratic principles underlines the urgency with which concerted efforts must be undertaken in this direction.

2:2. IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES:

- To broaden the support base for political and economic reforms in Africa;
- To mobilise student and trade unions to support the CSSDCA process as a fundamental basis for the reform process in Africa;

- To facilitate sharing of country experiences in the democratisation process in Africa;

2:3 Justification

Leadership poses a major challenge to African countries, many of which share similar problems and concern. Yet the leadership recruitment process in Africa remains skewed and without a carefully thought out programme of deliberate preparation. The need for a systematic, irreversible and progressive grooming of the successor generation is obvious. The deterioration of public spiritedness, the ever increasing problems of ethics, the imperatives of globalization, the emergence of a younger generation with a broader outlook and more open altitude in other parts of the world underlines the urgency with which concerted efforts to deepen the knowledge of democratic principles must be undertaken in this direction.

The *Africa Leadership Forum* (ALF) is responding to this existing situation by creating a mechanism for inspiring and exposing the younger generation to the manifold tasks and complex challenges awaiting them in their various countries and the continent.

The Sustenance Democratic Leadership Training Workshop for Student and Trade Union Leaders is the second in the series being organised. The First workshop was held in Dakar, Senegal in May 1998. Leadership to the ALF goes beyond political leadership but leadership at all levels of society.

2:4. AIMS & OBJECTIVES

The aim of the Democratic Leadership Training Workshop is to:

- Initiate a process of empowerment for male and female young leaders in democracy and human rights issues towards meeting the challenges in sustaining the fledgling democratic processes initiated in Southern Africa
- Improve the capacity of young leaders in Southern Africa to continuously expand their liberal political space;

- Provide opportunity for inter-political networks, inter-party networks and linkages towards positive collaboration at both lateral and vertical levels;
- Enhance opportunities for youth leaders to sharpen their leadership skills in participatory democracy and governance;
- Inculcate in young leaders the values and concepts of good and effective democratic leadership;
- To improve the quality and capacity of young trade and student union leaders to continuously expand their liberal political space towards sustaining the current wave of democratisation in Africa;
- To provide the opportunity for inter-union networks, inter-country networks and linkages towards positive collaboration at both lateral and vertical levels;
- To enhance opportunities for trade and help student union leaders to sharpen their leadership skills in participatory democracy and governance.

2:5. LONG-TERM GOALS:

- Cross-national cross-fertilisation of ideas and to help experiences between union leaders and party leaders;
- Imbue in these categories of young leaders necessary attitudinal disposition that are supportive of liberal political structures and processes;
- Simulate for their benefit possible scenarios confronting Africa in the next millennium as well as the demands and strains these will place of various structures;
- Promote the ascendancy of the values of routinisation of conflicts, constitutionalisation of right, decent and adaptive leadership.

2:6. Programme Activity

In all there were 28 participants from the Southern Africa Region (represented by participants from South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Zambia, Malawi, Namibia).

While introducing themselves and their expected gains at the end, of the workshop, participants in sum all expected to be well informed in leadership procedures and to return to their respective countries and occupations more equipped than before.

The duration of the workshop was five days. The first day's session represented a broad overview of the democratic structures in Africa vis-a-vis the rest of the world; the presentations for the rest of the days set the tone for participant's capacity building.

The workshop comprised 11 sessions on the following topics:

- Africa and the World Today
- Understanding Leadership
- Adaptive Leadership Skills
- Understanding Political Liberalisation
- Our Vision of the State
- Personal Empowerment
- Effective Communication
- Leadership and the Information Revolution
- Coalition Building
- Lobby and Advocacy
- Managing Expectations

There were also case studies and simulation exercise which introduced practical role playing and leadership activities to complement the theoretical background provided by the other sessions. Each presentation was also followed by ample question time giving participants full involvement in the workshop to clarify points, make suggestions and contribute their experiences to the presentations.

- **COUNTRY REPORTS**

In this session, participants presented a broad perspective of the democratic structures and administration in their individual countries. This was required of participants as part of the preparation towards the workshop.

- **CITY TOUR**

A study tour was organised to the city of Windhoek where participants were able to visit the parliament, the Prime Minister Office, the Namibian Polytechnic and the University of Namibia.

- **POST -WORKSHOP ASSESSMENT**

A well-structured assessment form was designed for participants to evaluate the five day workshop. This was done in two parts, the first part dealing with the general quality and organisation of the programme, and the second part dealing with the specific sessions of the programme. Responses tabulated and analysed indicated that all participants were of the general view that the quality of the workshop was very good and the core value of the programme to their respective leadership role is excellent.

2:7. CONCLUSION

The workshop was an overall success, as it rejuvenated the leadership qualities among participants. The organisers were well commended by all the participants for the selection of topics as well as the choice of resource persons whom they found well versed in their subjects. It also established the necessary networks and linkages among the young leaders of the sub-region as a necessary step towards promoting democracy, good governance and development in Africa.

SECTION THREE: Improving the Status of Women in Africa; Challenges for the Future

3:1. Introduction

At the *Africa Leadership Forum's* ninth Annual Meeting of African Leaders held 1997 in Accra, Ghana, on *Empowering Women for the 21st Century: The Challenge for Politics, Business, Development and Leadership*, to measure women's participation in the economic and political spheres in Africa, especially with regards to leadership positions, participants made some key recommendations. One of them was that African nations should be ranked - based on a progressively refined set of indicators - to reflect their accomplishment as regards women's participation in the political and economic spheres, in particular with respect to leadership positions, and the advancement of women in general. For these indicators, it was also suggested that benchmarks should be determined and placed in a time frame during which progress should be attained; they would thus become a target for policy makers, companies and society at large, who would feel compelled to devise strategies for the attainment of these targets.

Underlying this recommendation is the concern that all African countries have made commitments to women's advancement in the 1995 UN *Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action*. A priority aspect of these commitments was women's increased empowerment, especially as evidenced by women's occupation of leadership positions in government. Equally, there is a concern that African countries should meet their commitments to give women equality of opportunity in law, under the law, and in administrative practice, according to their commitments under the UN *Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women* (CEDAW)

The 2nd Africa Women's Forum convened in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire from the 23rd to the 24th August, 1999 under the theme *Improving the Status of Women in Africa; Challenges for the Future* focused mainly on this Index. In attendance at the Meeting, whose opening session was marked by a brilliant Keynote Address by H.E Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo, Former Prime Minister of Portugal, were over 90 participants including women leaders from various women networks in

Africa, ministers and parliamentarians, politicians as well as professional women.

Participants also included representatives of some international and intergovernmental agencies notably, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), The African Development Bank, (ADS), The United Nations Development Fund For Women (UNIFEM), Africa Recovery, the Joint Centre for Political and Economic Studies, Global Coalition for Africa (GCA), the International Commission of Jurists, and the Centre for Strategic Initiatives.

The meeting was hosted by the African Development Bank and was convened by H.E Mrs. Graca Machel The opening ceremony was presided over by H.E Mrs. Anne-Therese Ndong Jatta, Secretary of State of the Department of Education, The Gambia. The major objectives of the meeting were:

- To identify strategies that could be adopted for broadening the support base for the *Index on the Status of women in Africa*, as a negotiation platform towards building a critical mass of women leaders in Africa, and for the advancement of women in general;
- To explore methods that could be used for further broadening and deepening the *Index on the Status of Women in Africa*;
- To identify possible modalities and strategies for effectively utilising the *Index on the Status of Women in Africa* as a strong negotiating platform for women and civil society organisations in Africa.

3:2. THE INDEX: An Overview

The *Index on the Status of women in Africa* was presented to the Meeting by the Consultants, Sara Longwe and Roy Clarke, and it was comprehensively reviewed by Mrs. Ruth Odhiambo Ochieng, Director, Isis-WICCE, Uganda.

1. The Index was conceived by using existing baseline data as the framework for progressive improvement, which identifies and distinguishes between

two composite indicators, for the purpose of establishing women's level of empowerment in Africa.

The Women's Self-Reliance Index (**WSI**) is defined as women's individual capacity to advance in terms of their education, training and access to resources. It is a function of indicators such as level of education share of earned income, proportion of women in industry, skills training, ownership of land and capital, and access to credit. According to the Index, women's occupation of self-reliance positions may be *accommodated* within the existing patriarchal system of male privilege, and male control over the gender division of labour, and the allocation of resources, without a clear impact on women's collective empowerment.

2. Women's **Empowerment** Index (**WEI**) is defined as women's actual exercise of power over the allocation of resources and their ability to control public policy. This is a function of equally weighted indicators on women's occupation of decision-making positions in the public domain, such as seats in parliament, and top management positions. The Index reiterates that the strength of women's occupation of leadership positions lies in its potential to transform society in the direction of equal rights for women. Empowerment extends beyond bringing women into existing structures of public governance as they are, to effectively transforming them, especially at decision-making levels, to be inclusive of just and humane forces that can guard against the perpetration of any kind of oppression or inequality.
3. African countries are ranked in the Index in the order of their score on the **WEI**. Correlations between the two indices and between selected indicators are also made. However, the Index points out that a common yardstick for benchmarks and targets cannot be used for all governments, due to variations in 'baseline' starting points of different countries, and in other interacting obstacles to progress from one country to another. These variations are more clearly perceived after looking at the values for **WSI** and **WEI** for different African countries. A brief statistical comparison of the Africa region with other regions of the world, looking at women's level of representation in decision making positions confirm

similarities in global trends in the status of women in leadership. It was observed that the African inter-country comparisons between the Women's Self-Reliance Index (WSI) and the Women's Empowerment Index (WEI) presented do not reveal any clear pattern of correlation between the WSI and the WEI. Some countries with high WSI were found to have high WEI, others with high WSI have low WEI.

4. Contrary to occupation of self reliance positions, women's occupation of leadership positions, it was noted, carries with it the key *transformatory* potential, to address the underlying discrimination and oppression which are the more fundamental and intractable aspects of gender issues, and the underlying causes of gender gaps. Women's occupation of leadership positions potentially enables women to address gender issues in all other areas of social and political life. For strategic benefit, it was recognised that the challenge for the women's movement is how to find the transformatory potential within the fairly high level of achievement at the self-reliance level, as a springboard into empowerment process. It was, however recalled that empowerment cannot be defined purely in terms of women's occupation of decision making positions in society, but rather as the process by which women collectively recognise their problems, and mobilise to act to achieve gender equality. Placed in a more or less chronological perspective, women's empowerment process involves three focal engagements, namely conscientisation, mobilisation and control, which were examined in considerable detail.
5. The **WEI** is presented as the central interest in the Index. Because women's empowerment in the Index focused on women's representation in higher levels of decision making positions in public institutions, it was recognised that it is a rather rough measure of women's empowerment as it overlooks the possibility of some women public office holders not actually exercising power, and the likelihood of impacts made by some women in background positions in shaping public policy. The Women's Empowerment Index was, however, retained as a basis for a simple, systematic and standardised method for measuring national progress, and for comparative purposes. Greater emphasis was laid on the extent to which women occupy higher levels of decision-making in society, so that

they are in a position to challenge and change present structures of gender inequality.

6. Ensuing discussions stressed that political and electoral discourse and frameworks such as electoral laws and procedural norms and practices constitute core determining factors of occupation of leadership positions. Women's subordination, it was recalled, is perpetuated by existing laws, regulations and beliefs in existing patriarchal systems, gender discrimination, gender oppression, patriarchal ideology, culture and coercion, rather than their education, or lack of enabling personal abilities and attributes. These questions would be considered in future editions of the Index.
7. Finally, practical strategies, which are needed to promote the process of women's empowerment, are suggested in the Index. These are collective strategies of political action and negotiation to advance women's political representation, to gain increased control of public decision making positions, and to end gender discrimination through legislation, government policy, development policy and grassroots action.
8. Participants were unanimous on the relevance of periodic monitoring and evaluation of progress as an essential tool to support all strategies aimed at pushing political parties and governments towards increased representation of women at the political and administrative levels of government. Policy and planning with an understanding of gender does not come naturally to people, whether women or men. Statistics in organisational, institutional and operational leadership will be required to foster gender-sensitive analyses and changes. While not underrating the importance of Government policies and action plans, actual numerical facts facilitate the setting of benchmarks, for the implementation of government commitments on women's participation. They provide concrete evidence of outcomes in terms of meaningful progress realised, inconsequentiality and even regression as the case maybe.

9. The Africa Leadership Forum was highly commended for initiating and effectively developing the basic framework for measuring and monitoring State accomplishments towards women's empowerment in Africa. Participants underscored the value of the Index for gender equality agenda in Africa, and strongly urged various development partners and women networks themselves to support the Africa Leadership Forum towards progressively deepening and strengthening the Index. Coming just before the review of the Addis Ababa meeting where African countries will evaluate the progress achieved in implementing the Dakar and Beijing commitments, the Index was described as an innovative and well-timed initiative for assessing progress and identifying gaps in women's participation in leadership and development in Africa.

3:3. CONCLUSION:

Chairman of the *Africa Leadership Forum*, H.E Dr Mario Da Graca Machungo, Former Prime Minister of Mozambique thanked the leadership of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), BILANCE and the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA), for their material support for the Meeting and the African Development Bank for its support and hosting of the Meeting. To participants, he expressed the deep appreciation of the Africa Leadership Forum for their co-operation in overcoming all odds to honour the Meeting. Reaffirming the commitment of the Africa Leadership Forum to greater gender equality, the ALF Chairman, observed that gender development has emerged as a major dimension of development efforts. He observed that African women have demonstrated capabilities and potentials that extend far beyond domestic and reproductive tasks, that must be recognised and tapped to fuel development efforts. He described the *Index on the Status of Women in Africa*, both in its conception and focus to be a negotiation platform, a social barometer, intended to gauge the exact position of the African woman in the development continuum as a basis for appropriating urgent and result-oriented responses to the plight of women in Africa. Its appeal to collaborative rather than confrontational approaches to gender equality, he observed, is a reflection of the African woman's apprehension of gender relations as conciliatory rather than combative, giving various development actors an opportunity for constructive alternative approaches to gender development issues. Dr. Machungo challenged participants

to correct the inevitable flaws appearing in the Index and treat them as normal occurrences to all novel initiatives.

SECTION FOUR: OCCASIONAL SEMINAR SERIES 2

Transparency and Accountability in Financing National Security

4:1. Introduction

The Africa Leadership Forum, as part of its Occasional Seminar Series, convened a one-day seminar on *Transparency and Accountability in Financing National Security* on Wednesday, October 13, 1999. The meeting attended by experts, scholars, senior journalists and members of the ALF secretariat.

The Occasional Seminar Series was *initiated* partly to provide the ALF with an intellectual platform for defining and articulating its position on national policies and programmes, as a means of broadening the consultative base of the Forum, if the quality of its technical support and contribution must be enhanced.

The seminar is also significant at the level of providing a major focal point for the ALF democratic sustenance project. The report of the seminar will be made available to the National Assembly, the Federal Government and the ALF Network of resource persons and consultants worldwide.

4:2 Major Considerations

- i. What are the imperatives of national security?
- ii. How can we enhance accountability and transparency in security expenditures without jeopardising national security?
- iii. What kind of political structure can guarantee accountability and transparency in national security?
- iv. How can we ensure that security votes are used to enhance the liberty of the people and not as an instrument of vendetta?
- v. Are existing constitutional provisions sufficient in ensuring transparency and accountability in national security?

4:3 National Security

Participants tried to articulate the dynamics and the imperatives of national security and attempted to locate them within the context of Nigeria's contemporary political experience. They juxtaposed internal and external security, one of which, they said provides the support structure for the other. They also explored the structural imperatives of national security at the various levels of government under the military and democratic dispensation and concluded that the concept of national security has been grossly abused in both types of government in Nigeria in the past, whether at the level of transparency and accountability or at the level of human rights violations. They noted, however, that military governments are naturally more culpable of the abuse because, under successive military rule in Nigeria, national security has been transformed into a punitive mechanism for containing perceived and imaginary 'security threats' and for 'ocultifying' the institutions of the state.

4:4 Financing, accountability and transparency

Participants noted that national security is a very complex issue. Therefore, national security financing is very elaborate and extensive. And because of the utmost confidentiality and covert nature of security operation, its financing cannot be discussed on the floor of the assembly. Therefore, such activities have to be taken care of by security vote. Moreover, because it is often difficult to determine what exactly constitute national security problem at a particular point in time, or potential national security problem in the foreseeable future, the extent of finances required to adequately maintain national security can, at best only be determined by projections.

The shrouds of secrecy that necessarily surround the conduct of affairs of national security also create a major problem of accountability because the accounting system cannot be subjected to the normal civil service accounting procedures. This therefore, provides a convenient cover for public officers with dubious tendencies to perpetrate all kinds of abuse. Participants however maintained that it is erroneous to think that security vote is not an accountable expenditure and therefore, can be dispensed to suit the pleasure of the officer in charge of it. Although, the final expenditure of national security vote is

difficult to account for because the nature of what constitute the actual expenditure may have to be protected in the interest of the state, the vote can still be subjected to a specialised auditing system to arrest the wanton profligacy that is normally perpetrated with security votes.

4:5 Conclusions and Recommendations

- i. An integrated programme of training workshops, utilising finance and public policy experts, retired military officers and senior security personnel, should be designed for the defence and the public accounts committee of the Senate to enhance their supervisory capacity over the executive on the issue of national security operations and expenditures.
- ii. Perpetual classification of national security documents has provided an effective cover for public officials to perpetrate all kinds of abuses. Therefore, certain classified documents should be de-classified after a period of time to remove this cover and ensure that public officials in charge of national security operations are eventually held accountable for their actions in office. This will serve as a deterrence mechanism against abuse.
- iii. National security has to be democratised by prioritising collective security interest of the people of Nigeria and elevate it to a crucial guiding principle for determining national security interest and operations.
- iv. Democracy is a crucial factor in ensuring transparency and accountability in national security. However, the relevant House Committees as well as the opposition must be strengthened and allow to operate unencumbered if democracy must be made to work for this purpose.
- v. Guidelines should be developed for the spending of security votes. This should clearly define what constitute national security and set a distinction between hospitality and other contingency expenditures and national security expenditures. The guidelines should also set a limit to the amount of money a public officer can spend without recourse to the

House for approval. And, to ensure compliance to the guidelines, the Accountant-General should be strengthened to enable him to play a truly supervisory role on the account.

- vi. While the need to maintain secrecy in national security interest may necessitate excluding the entire House from national security operations and expenditures, no document related to this should be protected from the relevant house committee, which must know whatever is to be done in the name of national security without the fear of leakage since such members are bound by oath to maintain the secrecy of classified official matters.
- vii. National security at the level of military intervention in other countries should be determined by collective national interest with post-conflict benefits to the country and its people clearly defined. This will go a long way in ensuring transparency and accountability because if such missions are embarked upon with the people's interest in mind, there will be no need to hide it from the relevant representatives of the people.
- viii. Collective security can be enhanced if the level of patriotism in the country is high and they are made to have a sense of responsibility to the country. If the citizens are to be made more patriotic to the country, however, nepotism, ethnicity and tribalism have to be combated as major factors militating against patriotic development of the people.
- ix. It is very important to deconstruct the public perception of national security born out of the gross violations of the past. The media could, therefore be employed to help in redefining the entire concept of national security and presenting it to the public as a mechanism for enhancing the liberty of the people.
- x. Different levels of financial control should also be instituted for the operations of security vote in order to guarantee checks and balances and compliance with the operative guidelines.

Most cases of human rights violations in the past are traceable to over-reaction and over-sensitivity to security matters. This is caused by lack of a proper and efficient security structure. Therefore, a comprehensive and efficient security system should be devised to protect the people without undue harassment.

SECTION SIX: OCCASIONAL SEMINAR SERIES 3

Towards a Collective National Security

5:1. Introduction

The third Occasional Seminar Series on the theme, *Towards A Collective National Security* was held on Friday, November 12 1999. The seminar, which held at the ALF secretariat, Ota was chaired by General Adetunji Olurin (rtd.) and was attended by Major General David Jemibewon (rtd.), Minister for Police Affairs, Mrs. Modupe Adelaja, Minister of State for Defence, as well as experts, scholars, state ministers, policy makers, journalists and members of the general public.

In his introductory remarks, the *Africa Leadership Forum Director, Ayodele Aderinwale*, painted a grim catalogue of crisis and violent confrontations that the country has been engulfed in the past few weeks. This situation he said, has created a pervading atmosphere of insecurity to the lives and property of everyone living within the Nigerian border and even constitute a major threat to the country's nascent democracy. The security situation in the country, he said, has degenerated so badly that unless everyone is involved, as a stake-holder, in developing a comprehensive and realistic framework for a new and effective security arrangement, the country may soon drift into a new season of chaos, such that was never experienced even during the darkest days of military dictatorship. It is this concern therefore, and as a part of the Africa Leadership Forum democratic sustenance programme that informed the theme of the seminar, hoping to use it a veritable platform for bringing all stakeholders together to work out effective strategies for an all-involving and all-inclusive security system that will guarantee safety of lives and property of Nigerians everywhere within the borders of this country as a fundamental basis for all other democratic sustenance efforts.

The chairman on his part underlined the need for everyone to see the matter at hand as a serious and urgent problem, which also deserve an equally desperate attention. Security, he said, is condition sine qua non, to all development efforts within a country. He therefore, exhorted participants to bring the best of their intellect, insight and experience to bear on the subject matter, so that at the end of the day, a workable path may have been defined out of the problem. He pointed out that national security is too serious a matter to be left to the government alone as no government can, on its own and by its own devices, guarantee a totally effective security. He maintained that the security of any nation is the responsibility of every citizen of the country, youths and elders, men and women alike.

5:2. MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS

- i. How do we conceptualise national security to embrace all the ramifications and dimensions of national security concerns?
- ii. How do we make national security truly collective?
- iii. To what extent do existing sociological units, religious, sectarian and communal groups cause, aggravate or contribute to conflicts?
- iv. What are the various flash points and precipitants of national security threats, including separatist and sectarian tendencies and how can they be effectively redressed and contained?
- v. To what extent does the existing resources sharing formula and perceived injustice contribute to the security problem in the country?
- vi. How do we develop a volatility index and tracking system for early warning of security problem?
- vii. To what extent do the multi-nationals contribute to conflict situations and how can they be involved in a collective national security order?

- viii. How does the general problem of criminal acts and crimes fall within the scope of national security considerations?
- ix. Are existing security framework and apparatuses adequate for maintaining national security?

5:3 what is collective National security?

Participants defined security as a state or condition of feeling of safety, protection from danger or worry, and a situation free of encumbrances and apprehension. Similarly, national security was defined as the sum total of both the economic and political realisation of a nation, which also entails good governance and human rights. That is, a state or condition where a nation is neither embroiled in internal crisis nor beleaguered by fear of internal or external aggressions. And, because achieving national security requires collective awareness, consciousness and efforts, collective national security means putting in place a mechanism by which every individual within a country feels secure and a general feeling of safety pervades the country.

5:4 Communal crises as a threat to national security

Participants examined the root causes of communal crises and attempted to determine how social structure and values and economic problems cause, contribute to or aggravate security problems across different levels and segments of social existence. Participants were quick to agree that the failure of successive governments to provide for these communities, basic amenities, infrastructures and social services is a major factor eroding security in the communities. This is because, the state of inequality that is necessarily created by the impoverishment of these communities incites them to agitate for an improved condition of living comparable to what they see flaunted at them everyday by the more affluent members of their communities. It was therefore concluded that economic security is a basic and necessary condition for national security.

Imbalances and perceived injustice in the allocation of national resources breeds feelings of insecurity and neglect which in turn lay the foundation for

the crystallization of defiant attitudes that fuel the tendencies to threaten national security. Participants also noted that sustained environment of neglect and deprivation is capable of eroding all other higher and moral values and prioritising materialism as an avenue of escape. This attitude could originate from the family level and spread to the larger units of the society. In this context, participants tried to locate the place of corruption both as a cause and a consequence of value distortion. It was agreed that corruption has basically subverted the ability of the basic units of authority to sustain the confidence and trust of the people who therefore, try every means to make the institutions ineffective. In other words, corruption breeds marginalisation, neglect, dislocation of moral values, which in the long run breeds violence agitation. Participants however, pointed out that other forms of insecurity also encourage corrupt enrichment. In this regard, premature retirement was cited as problems that compel public servants to greedily acquire wealth in preparation for the 'rainy days' through corrupt means.

In view of this, participants therefore, identified the challenge to be that of creating a people-based government, a government that will make the people stake-holders and a security system that will make the people a central focus. It was therefore thought important that as a starting point, efforts should be made to communalise the security apparatuses and make the police truly people friendly by bridging the gap between them and the people.

It was also considered of paramount importance that the youths should be made the central focus of any security arrangement since they are the ones often directly involved in the violent conflicts.

5:5 Sectarian Conflicts

The major question that participants sought to have answered here was whether religion constitutes a potential or actual threat to national security. The consensus was that religion by itself does not constitute a threat to security, but has for years served as a ready tool in the hands of the elite who manipulate religious sentiments to serve their parochial interests. It was therefore noted that the various sectarian conflicts in the country have reflected a gross failure on the part of the Nigerian elite who define the society, determine its direction

and its moral values. It was noted however, that there is a lack of elite consensus on many national issues including the role religion should play in national life. This attitude by the elite has created the impression that there is a divergence between what the elite wants and what the people want. The challenge therefore, is how to get the elite to begin a process of national re-engineering and redefinition of societal values and how to get them to forge a consensus on fundamental issues of national survival. On the side of the followership, there should also be a concerted efforts to rebuild the civil society by making them aware that they also have important roles to play as stakeholders in the security of the nation. Government should also actively involve the NGOs and other community institutions in educating the people on their rights and responsibilities.

5:6 Separatist tendencies

The proliferation of separatist groups and armies of ethnic irredentism was considered by participants to be of grave consequence. It was agreed that regardless of any other containment measures, government should undertake an exhaustive study of these groups with the aim of determining their actual grievances, their strategies and their tendencies. Participants acknowledged that the grievances in the Niger-Delta area are real and noted that neglect and abandonment as in the case of the Niger-Delta, is an important factor in any national security consideration. Selfishness, intolerance, injustice in the distribution and utilisation of national resources and ignorance, all play crucial roles in the Niger-Delta problem.

It was therefore noted that a structure has to be put in place to forge a consensus on policy issues, on health, education, shelter, employment and so on. This, it was believed, would enhance public spiritedness on the side of the people. This will also address the problem of lack of patriotism that many have pointed out as a major factor in the security problem. It was believed that if the people were properly catered for, it would also enhance their patriotism and make them to feel genuinely a part of the state. To address the separatist problem and the emerging trend of warlordism, participants pointed out that responsible leadership has to be underlined as a major factor. The crusade, they

noted, should start from the local level by enhancing the participatory nature of the country's democracy.

5:7 Viability of existing security structures

In view of the prevalence of violence in the country, participants were quick to agree that the security structure in the country is not sufficient and therefore needs to be comprehensively reviewed. The police was not prepared for the responsibility of policing in a post-military Nigeria. This, they noted, is responsible for the woeful performance of the force in the maintenance of law and order since the transition to civil democracy. To begin to prepare the police for the emerging challenges therefore, the entire structure of the force need to be overhauled to make them more compliant to their new working environment.

It was also considered important that the police system be communalised and the people directly involved in the policing of their communities. Towards this end, it was considered important that the viability of the community as a unit of policing be restored. This could be done by saddling the communal system with the responsibility of policing through legislative instruments.

Participants pointed out that what the country is currently passing through is some kind of post-transition trauma. Bottled up resentment carried over from years of military repression are being ventilated into the new democratic 'atmosphere. Incidentally, the security structure in place is not prepared for this challenge. Therefore new security arrangements for the states and the entire nation has to be fashioned out.

Participants rejected the idea of state police, describing it as diversionary. It however, agreed that the present, arrangement that puts the final order for mobilising the police in each state with the Inspector General of police is cumbersome and does not comply with the emergency situation that some of the crises have created. It was pointed out that the police have to be retrained for effective handling of equipment and re-oriented for the especial responsibility of policing a democratic society.

Participants were also informed that the government has mapped out a strategy for overhauling the police in order to make it more compliant with modern trends and emerging challenges. Participants learnt that about 10,000 to 15,000 policemen would be eased out annually over a period of time, while 25,000 will be recruited over the same period from the ward to the local government and then the state level. This would be done at the average of 10 per ward. It was thought that this measure will not only minimise the high level of illiteracy in the force, but will also regenerate it morally. Participants also noted that the judiciary is an integral part of policing, and there cannot be an efficient police without an effective judiciary. It was therefore noted that for the police to be effective, the people have to support them by giving them information and assisting them in other ways when invited to do so.

The poor welfare facilities and condition of service of the police was also condemned by the participants who noted that no police man would be encouraged to give his best when he is not properly catered for. They therefore call for an improved welfare package for the police as well as work out an insurance policy that will take care of the men in case of disability and their families in case of death. In this regard, participants were also informed that a special fund tagged *Police Recovery Appeal Fund* will soon be launched. It was also suggested that the private sector be involved in financing the police as a way of complementing the efforts of the government.

To improve police-community relationship, participants were told that government is considering changing the name Nigerian Police Force to Nigerian Police Service. The justification for this is to make the police see their work as that of serving the people and not forcing them. The semiotic constitution of the police would also be altered as a part of this effort. The participants were told that the elephant in the police emblem would be changed for something less heavy and more quick and effective.

Participants noted that the media have a great role to play by sensitising the public to their responsibility as citizens in ensuring the security of the country. The media could also help in probing the root causes of specific conflict situation with a view to preparing the ground for an effective remedy. In doing this, it was pointed out that the media even have a more onerous

responsibility in ensuring that a particular security problem is not blown out of proportion, distorted or falsified thereby compounding the problem.

Participants also lamented the ease with which Nigeria's territorial integrity is violated and foreign bandits invade border towns and villages. It was noted that this has been possible partly because of the ineffective policing system at the borders and the connivance of some unscrupulous citizens. While this was identified as a cross-border problem, participants submitted that what is required is an efficient joint patrol of the borders concerned by the police, the soldiers and immigration officers of the countries concerned.

5:8 Conclusions and Recommendations

- i. Conflict resolution mechanism at all levels particularly at the communal level must be strengthened. The judiciary must also be strengthened to enhance its efficiency and dignity.
- ii. Material factor in violent conflicts has to be sufficiently problematised. Therefore, government has to intensify its poverty alleviation projects and provide employment for the youths to prevent them from being employed to perpetrate acts of violence. Youths should be employed constructively to prevent them from being used for violent enterprise.
- iii. Alternative means of conflict resolution should be evolved by engaging leaders of warring parties at round table discussion where burning issues can be discussed and resolved amicably.
- iv. Militant groups should not be banned as this may induce them to go underground and from there perpetrate clandestine acts. Rather, these groups should be engaged in dialogue to determine the exact nature of their grievances.
- v. The tribal configuration between two borders enhances the permeability of the borders. The immigration system should be strengthened to check the influx of illegal aliens. The Ministry of Internal Affairs should pay special attention to this. The people should also be re-organised,

restructured and sensitised to identify and police aliens. The government has to pay special attention to border areas by providing them with basic infrastructure that will make them feel like true citizens and thereby minimising their propensity for unpatriotic conducts.

- vi. Government should look into the employment policy of multinational companies. The neglect of the Niger-Delta in terms of social welfare and basic amenities must be stopped. The neglect of the past must not continue. The companies and government should look for ways of minimising the idleness of youths in these areas by providing them gainful employment, education etc.
- vii. Policies on poverty alleviation and resource distribution should be monitored to ensure that they are implemented. The Niger Delta Commission should not go the way of OMPADEC. Government should reinforce its policy thrust towards job creation and provision of special welfare package for the unemployed.
- viii. Government must realise that security is a capital-intensive project and therefore must be prepared to mobilise all necessary resources to guarantee safety of lives and properties of Nigerians.
- ix. The government must not promote one religious interest to the detriment of the others. Therefore government should be less visible in all religious affairs. The citizens should be educated to respect the religious rights of other citizens.
- x. Religion and the family set up should be seen and treated as instruments of moral regeneration. The family in particular must play a crucial role in preparing their children for responsible citizenship.
- xi. Police welfare programme should be taken seriously and promptly executed to reinforce their commitments to duty. Similarly, police-civil society relationship has to be seen as a crucial factor in the maintenance of national security so that the two would be able to work together in the interest of everyone.

- xii. Citizenship and leadership training should be revived in schools to inculcate in the youths public spiritedness, sense of patriotism and responsibility to their society.
- xiii. The governor is the Chief Security Officer of the State. Therefore the present arrangement should be overhauled to empower the governor to give directives to the Commissioner of police in the state, but he should get clearance from the IG in doing this, while taking care of the time lag and administrative bureaucracy in getting it implemented.
- xiv. Effective propaganda campaign should be embarked upon that would discourage the various militant groups while at the same time sensitising every citizen to his responsibilities in the quest for national security.

SECTION SIX: PUBLICATIONS

Publications are one of the major activities of ALF. Apart from the *Africa Forum* Journal, ALF publishes periodically, reports of its conferences, seminars and study reports. These are aimed at providing effective documentation necessary for intellectualising the issues being grappled with as well as broadening access to the issues through wide dissemination of the reports.

In the year under review, ALF published four of these reports:

- **Comparative Study of Existing Sub-regional Security Protocols and Demilitarisation in Africa:** This is the report of a research study commissioned by the Africa Leadership Forum and funded by the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA). The study which was conducted by J' Bayo Adekanye, Bethuel Kiplagat and Nadir Mohammed, undertakes a comparative analysis of sub-regional security protocols existing in Africa. It also seeks to determine the nature and size of defence burden under current conditions of external debt adjustment pressures; compared military security expenditures with expenditures on social services to ascertain the basis for a peace dividend theory; and

suggested sustainable modalities for reduction of military expenditures within the context of a sub-regional security arrangement.

Ultimately, this study was intended as a means of building and consolidating initiatives on existing security protocols on the continent by assisting to provide hard facts on the nature and status of these protocols and recommend additional modalities and mechanisms that would facilitate a consensus on sub-regional security arrangements by identifying and persuading a number of presidents/Ministers in Africa to present it at both the OAU Council of Ministers Meeting and the Summit of Heads of States and Governments.

Africa and the Successor Generation: This contains summary report and papers presented at the 10th Anniversary Meeting of the Africa Leadership Forum, at Sheraton Hotel, Cotonou, Republic of Benin in 1998. The report enunciated the challenges ahead for cultivating the successor generation in Africa. It also examined the leadership recruitment process in Africa and its implication for governance and development; a gender perspective to evolving a sustainable youth leadership development; an alternative policy perspective of the successor generation in ensuring good governance in Africa; and the challenges and opportunities before the succeeding generation in Africa. The report also covers the implication of information and communication technologies for the African renaissance as well as the keynote address by the former Commonwealth Secretary General, Sir Shridath Ramphall.

Communication and Leadership for Empowerment: This also contains summary report and papers presented at the African Women's Forum held at the Arthur's Seat Hotel, Cape Town, South Africa in May 1998. The report focuses on such issues as: Overview of Women's networks in Africa Today and emerging Priorities and strategies; The impact of women's status on meaningful communication: consideration from the Cameroonian situation; Towards African Women Leadership: From Dream to Strategy; African women and the challenges of leadership development, among others.

Sub-regional Security Protocols and Demilitarisation in Africa: This is the report of the ALF conference of the same title already covered in the earlier part of this report.

Democratisation of African Parliaments and Political Parties: This is the report of proceedings of the ALF International Conference of the same title held in Gaborone, Botswana in July 1998, and published under the auspices of the World Bank Institute. It covers such issues as: African Parliaments and Political Parties: The Challenges for Democracy and Pluralism; Reconstructing African Democracies: Challenges for the 21st Century; The Hidden Agenda and Gate-Keeping: How African Women Are Kept Out of Politics. It also contains a report of the ALF and African Union of Parliamentarians (AUP) joint study towards reinvigorating the African Union of Parliaments as well as a comprehensive Code of Conducts for African Parliaments.